

D R A F T

16 JUN 1977

SAFEGUARDS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNDER
ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT OPTION #6 UNDER PRM-11

1. If Option #6 were selected and the role of the DCI strengthened, particularly in the area of the collection function, there would be the following safeguards against ignoring military requirements:

a. Both the resource allocation and tasking procedures would be done in an advisory collegial form where the DoD views would be expressed.

b. Particularly with major budget decisions or long-term tasking, there is no possibility in our present governmental structure of a single decisive authority in any event. It is more a question of having one person in charge in times of urgent decisions for tasking.

2. A second safeguard for DoD interests is the fact that DoD is headed by a Cabinet Officer with all the prestige that goes with that and right of direct appeal to the President.

3. Thirdly, the DoD is protected by its considerable influence and support on Capitol Hill. It is unlikely that in resource allocation issues anyone could ride roughshod over the DoD interests without considerable public attention.

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
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4. The DoD interests are also protected by the general support in the public domain including the media. Witness recent reports in The New York Times warning against the possibility of a "civilian on horseback" gaining too much authority and suggesting that we needed some more military influence in the intelligence seal!

5. Additionally, it should be noted that providing line authority to someone outside of DoD to what are now DoD elements does not equate to an assumed arbitrariness or neglect of DoD with respect to or neglect of DoD interests. Not only are there all the limitations noted above with respect to how arbitrary anyone given line authority over these elements could possibly be, but it is quite conceivable that such an authority would give better treatment to DoD concerns than is now the case. Today when it comes to tasking systems which are under the management of DoD, neither the DoD nor the DCI's staffs feel a heavy sense of responsibility for protecting DoD interests. The DoD people prefer to rely on systems totally under their own control; the DCI's staffs tend to view the DoD's position as program manager as tantamount to protecting his interests without their having to do so also. DoD probably gets the worst of both worlds.

cc: *Jim Taylor*



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